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Strategic nomination is the manipulation of an election through its candidate set (compare this to tactical voting, where the manipulation comes from the voters). Strategic nomination is not to be confused with campaign strategy, the methods candidates employ in political campaigns to win an election after nomination. == Independence of irrelevant alternatives == (詳細はvoting system is independent of irrelevant alternatives and therefore immune to strategic nomination. Independence of irrelevant alternatives, however, is a very hard property for a voting system to satisfy. This is illustrated by the following example of Condorcet's voting paradox: * 40 voters preferring candidate A to B to C * 35 voters preferring candidate B to C to A * 25 voters preferring candidate C to A to B With the above preferences and whatever candidate an election method chooses as a winner, another candidate can always secure a majority of votes against that winner by removing the third candidate. Since the absence of any candidate would leave the impression that the preference of the group of voters as a whole is a clear majority when by definition it is not when we consider the third candidate, one can argue that none of these candidates are actually "irrelevant." The candidates in the example above form a cycle known as the Smith set - their combined presence provides conflicting information (both to the election system as well as to observers) about who the greatest candidate is. Strategic nomination, then, involves hiding this information from the voting system by excluding one of the candidates. Because of this strange relationship between the candidates and the voters, strategic nomination through this manner is doubtful as it becomes very much a question of whether the presence or absence in an election of a potential "cycle-maker" (provided one exists and can be found) can be decided by those who seek to gain from it. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「strategic nomination」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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